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Abstract
This article compares the determinants of public corruption from multiple 
theoretical lenses and then tests which ones are more effective in curbing 
public corruption in the context of the U.S. states. We find that the 
stringency of state tax and expenditure limits, fiscal transparency, voter 
turnout rates, unified Democratic control, divided control of state governments, 
political competitiveness, population with Scandinavian ancestry, and 
educational attainment are all significantly and negatively associated with the 
extent of public corruption. Compared with other approaches to curbing 
corruption (i.e., the lawyer’s approach, the businessman’s approach, and the 
economist’s approach), those that restrict public officials’ discretionary power 
and encourage educated citizens’ participation appear to be more effective in 
reducing corruption in the U.S. states.
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INTRODUCTION
This article compares various theoretical determinants of public corruption from the 
perspective of their effectiveness in curbing corruption. For this comparison, we review the 
existing literature related to the determinants and cures for corruption across countries, and 
test which among those suggested by multiple theoretical approaches are the more effective 
ones for reducing public corruption in the context of the U.S. states. Lopez-Iturriaga and 
Sanz (2018) find that most existing corruption studies discussing the causes of corruption 
tend to focus on cross-country comparisons and, therefore, call for further studies 
employing within-country data and contexts. 
One of the major challenges of corruption-related studies is the difficulty in defining 
corruption and choosing practical measures of corruption for quantitative research with a 
large N. Corruption is broadly understood as deviation from the rational-legal Max 
Weberian bureaucracy. Lancaster and Montinola (1997) categorize various definitions of 
corruption according to six  broad meanings: 1) corruption implies public officials’ 
behaviors deviating from the public interest (public interest-centered definition), 2) 
corruption means public officials’ behaviors that are different from legal norms (public 
office-centered definition), 3) corruption involves public officials’ behaviors deviating not 
only from legal norms but also from moral norms (public norm-based definition), 4) 
patrimonialism implies “a form of domination with an administrative apparatus whose 
members are recruited from personal dependents of the ruler”, 5) corrupt public officials 
regard their public office as their private business (market-oriented definition), and 6) all 
public officials’ behaviors deviating from the ideal principal-agent relationship are defined 
as corruption. A long debate on the definition of corruption has led to a consensus that 
corruption refers to public officials who engage in behaviors that use their public office, 
authority, and power for their personal gain. Corruption also involves various elements of 
nepotism, clientelism, favoritism, misuse of public power, patronage appointment, and moral 
decay. Among the various definitions, the strictest one defines corruption as deviation from 
formal rules regulating public workers’ behaviors. Because corruption occurs clandestinely, 
it cannot be openly measured. Thus, most empirical studies capture the extent of corruption 
by measuring the perceived degree of corruption instead of the actual level of corruption 
(Lancaster and Montinola, 1997, 188-191). 
The existing literature on corruption generally concurs that it is not possible to specify 
a complete and comprehensive definition of corruption. It is also impossible to develop a 
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comprehensive list of corruption practices that is universally applicable to all societies over 
a long period of time. Different societies have different perceptions, cultures, and rules in 
relation to corruption, which also change over time even within a society. The term 
definitional quagmire expresses the difficulty in seeking a complete and universal definition 
of corruption and constructing a comprehensive measure of the actual level of corruption 
(Johnston, 1994). Thus, it is suggested that researchers might apply a useful definition and 
a practically available measurement of corruption that are appropriate for their specific 
research concerns and contexts, rather than becoming stalled in a quagmire of seeking 
perfect definitions and measurements of corruption (Collier, 1999; Kaufmann, 1998). 
Following in the tradition of corruption studies, this article limits the category of 
corruption to its strictest definitional sense, namely, deviation from formal rules regulating 
public officials’ behaviors. We capture the extent of corruption through the number of 
public officials who are convicted of the violations of the corruption-related laws within a 
country. Additionally, we argue that the number of convictions should be a better indicator 
of corruption than the number of indictments and caseloads. This is because it is possible 
that a number of indictments and accusations will eventually be dismissed by the courts 
and not convicted as corruption. We thus assume that convicted cases correspond to 
corruption cases.  
This article proceeds as follows. The next section reviews relevant literature on 
corruption and establishes the theoretical framework of the study. We then present the data 
and develop empirical models to test the explanatory power of multiple theoretical lens 
related to corruption. Next, we report the empirical results of the models and conclude by 
discussing the implications of our research findings. 
MULTIPLE THEORETICAL LENSES FOR EXPLAINING 
CORRUPTION
This study makes use of a comprehensive review of the literature on corruption1). 
Most of the research reviewed involved cross-country studies. Amongst them, this article 
focuses on the theories that are applicable to a within-country study, particularly in the 
context of the U.S. states. 
Public choice theorists argue that public officials, like private individuals, make choices 
1) We tabulate the comprehensive list of the existing literature in the Appendix (Tables A1~A4) for brevity.
to maximize their private self-interest (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Niskanen 1971). A 
public official is portrayed as a rational utility maximizer who could engage in corruption 
when the potential benefit from corruption exceeds its potential cost (Rose-Ackerman and 
Palifka 2016; De Graaf 2007). The theorists presume that maximizing the cost of 
corruption and minimizing its potential benefit should deter or at least reduce unethical 
behavior. We summarize discussions of the determinants of corruption from multiple 
theoretical lenses and from the perspective of this benefit/cost comparison approach.
Bureaucratic Determinants of Corruption 
Public bureaucrats are susceptible to corruption when “there is a lot of money lying 
around loose and no one is watching” (Wilson 1966, 31). Bureaucratic explanations of 
corruption are related to opportunities for corruption, including the following five key 
factors: bureaucratic regulation, size of bureaucracy, bureaucratic structure (fragmentation 
and decentralization), wages, and fiscal institutions to constrain the power of public 
officials. 
With reference to the first factor, the public interest model of bureaucratic regulation 
assumes that regulation counteracts market failures and is instituted by government officials 
to maximize the general welfare (Pigou 1938). However, the public choice literature on 
bureaucratic regulation suggests that regulations are captured by the regulated industries and 
usually benefit existing larger firms (Stigler 1971; Tullock 1967). Similarly, politicians and 
bureaucrats cater to business interest in order to maximize their private self-interests and 
use excessive bureaucratic regulations as a tool to extract larger bribes. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) argue that many regulations exist to give public officials “the power to 
deny them and to collect bribes in return for providing the permits” (601). When 
regulation is stricter and license approval processes are slower, private businesses are more 
likely to bribe government officials to avoid regulatory cost. Djankov et al. (2002) find 
that various measures of firm entry regulation are positively associated with the level of 
corruption in a cross-country sample. 
For the second factor, as the size of government (bureaucracy) increases, opportunity 
for corruption also increases. In addition, the size of government associates positively with 
the size of rent from corruption. A larger size of government means a greater amount of 
bureaucratic delay and induces rent-seekers to offer larger bribes (Goel and Nelson 1998). 
As Scully (1991) asserts, “The increase in the size and scope of government expenditure 
represents an enormous rise in the opportunities for rent-seeking through budgetary 
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reallocations” (91). Goel and Nelson (1998) also find that government size, in particular, 
spending by the U.S. state governments, does indeed have a strong positive association 
with corruption. 
The third factor, namely, the structure of bureaucracy, is also perceived to affect 
corruption. A more fragmented structure of government makes corruption less visible, 
which reduces the chance of corrupt officials being detected. Fragmentation also impedes 
coordination among public officials and incentivizes them to overgraze the common bribe 
base (Goel and Nelson 2011). Henriques (1986) argues that the fragmentation of 
government resulting from the proliferation of single purpose special districts stimulates 
corruption. On the contrary, the decentralization of government brings public officials closer 
to the people and stimulates inter-jurisdictional competition among governments for mobile 
resources, which enhances government accountability and discipline and, as a consequence, 
reduces corruption (Klitgaard 1988). 
Concerning the fourth factor, Becker and Stigler (1974) maintain that bureaucratic 
wages should be related to corruption. If public employees earn less than they could earn 
in the private sector, the probability of their committing corruption increases. However, a 
wage increase in the public sector reduces the need for corruption and makes bribe taking 
less attractive. Moreover, higher pay in the public sector makes it possible to attract and 
retain better qualified, more professional, and less corrupt public employees (Cornell and 
Sundell 2019). 
For the fifth factor, most fiscal institutions intend to constrain public officials’ fiscal 
discretion and reduce corruption. The Leviathan model argues that government officials are 
self-interested and maximize discretionary budget slack for private gains (Niskanen 1971, 
1975). Fiscal institutions serve as ex-ante rules that limit the policy choices of government 
officials and bind Leviathan because they prescribe what politicians can and cannot do 
(e.g., Chan and Mestelman 1988; Moene 1986). A harder budget constraint will lower 
budgetary slack (Borge et al. 2008). Tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) and balanced 
budget requirements of the state and local governments in the U.S. aim to limit the 
growth of government and impose fiscal discipline on public officials. TELs are expected 
to reduce opportunities for corruption by constraining government expenditure and revenue. 
Budgetary institutions aiming for transparency are also likely to reduce corruption. 
Transparency increases the chance that corruption will be detected. If budgets and other 
financial documents are transparent and available for all to see, it is more difficult for 
public officials to distort information and conceal their corruption (Anechiarico and Jacobs 
1996; De Graaf 2007). From the perspective of the principal-agent theory, transparent 
environments reduce information asymmetries between public officials and voters, and help 
align the interests of agents with those of principals. Transparency induces governments to 
report both their planned budgets and their actual execution to citizens so that the public 
(and its watchdogs) can monitor the budget process more effectively. This enhances public 
oversight on the allocation and spending of public resources, and leaves less room for 
agents to abuse public resources for their private gain (Blinded 2019). 
Political Determinants of Corruption 
Political explanations of corruption contend that politics can curb corruption if political 
actions raise the cost of corruption by increasing the probability that corruption will be 
detected and penalized. In this regard, the key factors discussed in the existing literature 
are political competition, citizen voting, gubernatorial term limit, and political ideology. 
Rose-Ackerman (1978) presents one of the most influential theories about the effect of 
political competition on corruption. When the level of political competition is low, political 
incumbents are more confident of their re-election and less motivated to hold accountability 
for their behaviors. It is possible for them to seek rent without being voted out of their 
office. However, a higher level of political competition (e.g., closely contested political 
elections) mobilizes critical voters and intensifies the need to scrutinize current government 
by opposing parties. This restricts elected officials’ incentives to use their office for private 
gain. Likewise, divided government is associated with a lower level of corruption because 
power sharing among political incumbents represents a variation of political competition. 
The political agency model posits that citizens (the principals) delegate authority to 
elected officials (the agents) to act on their behalf and in their interest (Barro 1973; 
Ferejohn 1986; Persson et al. 1997). Yet voters and politicians face conflicting motivations 
and incentives. Voters pay taxes to finance the provision of public goods and services. 
Politicians can extract rent from tax revenue collected, thus leaving fewer funds for public 
good provision. If voters perceive the current level of rent as too high, they vote the 
incumbent out of office (retrospective voting). However, this kind of vertical accountability 
works only if voters are actively involved in elections. An informed and active electorate 
enhances the probability that corrupt politicians will be punished for their corruption. 
Ferejohn (1986) states that achieving vertical accountability becomes harder in a 
multidimensional policy space because various voters would use their one vote to decide 
issues in different policy dimensions. Institutions such as citizen initiatives that reduce the 
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dimensionality of policy space help voters hold politicians more accountable, which results 
in a lower level of rent and corruption (Alt and Lassen 2003).
Gubernatorial term limits are expected to associate negatively with corruption. Given 
that governors in office are banned from holding their office again due to term limits, they 
are more likely to fight corruption to preserve not only their parties’ reputation but also 
their individual reputation (Escaleras and Calcagno 2009). 
Finally, Meier and Holbrook (1992) underline the effect of political ideology on 
corruption, although conflicting arguments for the association are possible. Conservative 
citizens often perceive politics as means of seeking self-interest of public officials, so they 
tend to be more tolerant of officials’ unethical behaviors. This encourages public officials 
to believe that the probability of being penalized for their corruption might be low. In 
contrast, conservatives who are strongly against larger governments tend to favor policies 
and laws to fight against waste, inefficiency, and corruption in public programs.
Economic and Demographic Determinants of Corruption 
Economic and demographic determinants of corruption are dominant factors according 
to the existing literature on corruption. These include level of income, income inequality, 
ethnic diversity, and female population. As the level of income increases in a society, the 
demand for corruption falls. In addition, a rise in income will make more resources 
available to curb corruption. It has been found that a high level of income has a 
significantly negative effect on corruption (e.g., Damania et al. 2004; Persson et al. 2003). 
On the contrary, a higher extent of income inequality is positively associated 
corruption for two reasons. First, the chance of being caught for a corrupt behavior is 
lower with a higher extent of income inequality because people who are at the lower end 
of the income spectrum are largely unaware and incapable of monitoring public officials. 
Second, when income inequality is higher, the benefit of corruption becomes greater for 
wealthy persons. However, the cost of corruption becomes lower because resources 
available for the masses of poor people to hold public officials accountable are constrained 
(Jong-Sung and Khagram 2005). Paldam (2002) argues that “a skewed income distribution 
may increase the temptation to make illicit gains” (224). 
Ethnic diversity is associated with a higher level of corruption. Members of a certain 
ethnic group often favor their group members over non-members (Vanhanen 1999). When 
there are multiple ethnic groups in a society, public officials tend to allocate resources 
towards supporters of their own ethnicity. Ethnic groups are more likely to support public 
officials of their own ethnicity even if they are known to be corrupt (Glaeser and Saks 
2006, 8). Ethnic diversity “rationalizes corruption extraction from others unlike self” 
(Maxwell and Winter 2004, 18).  
Finally, it is argued that the share of women in total population correlates with a 
lower level of corruption. Women are more trustworthy and more risk averse than men. 
Thus, they are willing to follow rules and feel there is a greater probability of being 
caught for corruption, which results in a lower level of corruption (Swamy et al. 2001).
Historical and Cultural Determinants of Corruption 
Historical and cultural explanations of corruption point out that historical and cultural 
traditions might affect the perceived cost of corruption. The key determinants of corruption 
from this perspective include urbanization, education, social capital, and immigration. 
Historically, urban environments foster conditions that are conducive to corruption. The 
social control of family and religion becomes weaker in urbanized areas, and government 
programs and resources are concentrated more in urbanized areas. In an urbanized 
environment, moreover, political machines tend to be established to “benefit individuals 
who supported the urban political machine, and corruption was used to compensate 
machine operators for their efforts” (Meier and Holbrook 1992, 138). Cities provide more 
opportunities for corruption than rural areas. 
The cultural explanations of corruption center on popular psychology. As Wilson 
(1966) asserts, “There is a particular political ethos or style which attaches a relatively low 
value to probity and impersonal efficiency and relatively high value to favors, personal 
loyalty, and private gain” (30). The middle-class reformers seek to eliminate the traditional 
political ethos and fight for a clean government. Meier and Holbrook (1992) argue that the 
middle-class preference opposing corruption can be captured by the education levels of the 
population. Well-educated citizens are less tolerant of corruption and more likely to push 
public officials to be more accountable. 
Corruption thrives in an environment where pro-social norms such as trust and altruism 
are absent (Banerjee 2016). The lack of social trust may diminish the sense of wrongdoing 
and neglect corruption in the society (Rotondi and Stanca 2015), which in turn breeds 
even more corruption (Banerjee 2016). According to Persson et al. (2013), citizens’ 
willingness to control corruption depends largely on their expectation of how many people 
in their society are engaged in corruption. If the majority perceives corruption as a 
widespread social norm, citizens are less likely to monitor and sanction corruption. Thus, a 
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higher level of social capital can increase citizens’ willingness and cooperation to control 
corruption. 
Lastly, immigration is often associated with a higher level of corruption. Immigrants 
from a society with a higher level of corruption may import their culturally corrupt 
baggage and provide more opportunities for corruption in the destination society. They also 
have fewer economic resources to lose and might perceive the cost of corruption as lower 
(Meier and Holbrook 1992). 
DATA, MODEL, & METHODOLOGY
Model Specification
Based on the multiple theories of corruption discussed in the previous section, we 
construct a regression model of the determinants of corruption in the context of the U.S. 
states as follows: 
 =  0 + 1 ( _ ) + 2 ( ) + 3 ( _ ℎ ) + 4 ( _ )  +  + + 
In our model,  is the observed level of corruption at state i in year t. The extent of 
corruption across the 50 states is captured both by the number of convictions per 10,000 
public employees and the number of convictions per 100,000 people of state population. 
The U.S. Department of Justice annually publishes the number of federal, state, and local 
employees who are convicted of federal corruption-related laws in a document entitled 
Report to the Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section. 
The reliability, relevance, and validity of the conviction measures have been discussed by 
many scholars and studies (e.g., Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 2009; Cordis and Milyo 2016; 
Glaeser and Saks 2006; Meier and Holbrook 1992; Zhang and Kim 2017). We estimate 
the extent of corruption in year t in three ways: the number of convictions in year t, the 
number of convictions in year (t+1), and the average number of convictions in years (t+1), 
(t+2), and (t+3). We use the lead values of the numbers of convictions, or those in years 
(t+1),(t+2), and (t+3) to capture the extent of corruption in year t, as it is possible that 
corruption cases convicted in year t actually took place in the previous years, not in year t.
Bureaucratic_Regulatory it is a vector of variables capturing state bureaucratic and 
regulatory determinants of corruption. They include the degree of bureaucratic regulation, 
the number of state public employees, the average level of state public employees’ wages, 
the extent of fiscal decentralization, the degree of state government fragmentation, the 
stringency of TELs, the stringency of state balanced budget rules, and the degree of state 
budget transparency.
Political it represents a set of political factors assumed to affect state corruption. These 
include voter turnout rates, the extent of state political competition, political ideology of 
citizens, political ideology of state governments, a dummy of term limit for governors, a 
dummy of citizen initiatives, a dummy of unified Democratic control of state governments, 
a dummy of unified Republican control of state governments, and a dummy of politically 
divided control of state governments.
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐_ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 is a vector of economic and socio-demographic drivers of 
state corruption. This determinant captures the level of personal income per capita, the 
extent of income inequality, the degree of ethnic diversity, and the percentage of female 
citizens in state population.
𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 _ 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑡 denotes the factors related to historical, cultural, and religious 
explanations of state corruption. These include the extent of educational attainment, social 
capital index, Scandinavian ancestry (%), and the percentage of urban population.
𝜃𝑖 implies state fixed effect to control for unobservable state attributes, is the 
time-specific effect to control for yearly changes in state external environment over 23 
years in the period 1986-2008, and is the random error term. Table I displays the detailed 
descriptive statistics of all variables, shows how to capture them, and where we collected 
the data.
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Table I. Descriptive Statistics: Variable Definition, Summary Statistics, and Data Sources
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max Data Source
Corruptemp
Number of state corruption-related 
convictions per 10,000 public 
employees
0.51 0.42 0 2.7
U.S. Department of 
Justice
Corruptpop
Number of state corruption-related 
convictions per 1,000,000 residents
0.33 0.30 0 2.5




The regulation sub-index of state 
economic freedom index
4.81 1.33 0.7 8.7 The Fraser Institutions
Number Gov’t 
Employees
Number of state government full-time 
employees
11.51 1.63 8.1 16.9




Average payroll for state full-time 
employees
3.46 0.11 3.2 3.8




The ratio of state expenditures to the 
sum of state and local government 
expenditures.
0.32 0.07 0.1 0.7
U.S. Census Bureau State 




The number of general-purpose local 
governments (counties, cities, 
township) per 1,000,000 residents
271.66 457.28 3.0 2797.2
U.S. Census Bureau State 
and Local Government 
Finance
TELs Stringency
An index that measures the 
restrictiveness of state tax and 
expenditure limits (TEL) 
24.13 8.08 0 32 Amiel et al. (2009) 
Balance Budgets 
Stringency
A variable that measures the 
stringency of state balanced budget 
rules (BBR). It ranges from 0 to 10, 
with higher values indicating stricter 
rules.
7.35 2.97 0 10
Krause and Melusky 
(2012) 
Fiscal Transparency 
An index that measures the degree of 
fiscal transparency of state budgeting 
processes
0.51 0.19 0.1 1




Percentage of the voting-eligible 
population turnout rate for the highest 
office election
12.42 12.57 1.0 74 U.S. Election Project
Political 
Competition
The folded Ranney index measures 
interparty competition of governmental 
partisan control, ranging from 0.5 to 
1. The larger the value is, the greater 
the interparty competition.
0.88 0.10 0.6 1 Klarner (2012)
Citizen Liberal 
Ideology
Berry et al. (1998) measure U.S. 
states’ political ideology.
50.53 15.11 8.4 96 Berry et al. (1998)
Gov’t Liberal 
Ideology
Berry et al. (1998) compute a 
weighted average of the ideology 
scores to measure state government’s 
political ideology. 
50.74 25.58 0 98 Berry et al. (1998)
Governor’s Term 
Limits
A dummy variable that indicates 
whether a governor is subject to term 
limits
0.72 0.45 0 1 The Book of States
Citizen Initiative 
Dummy
A dummy variable that indicates 
whether a state allows for citizen 
initiative
0.53 0.50 0 1




A dummy variable that indicates 
unified Democratic control of state 
governments
0.23 0.42 0 1 Klarner (2012)
Unified Republican 
Control
A dummy variable that indicates 
unified Republican control of state 
governments
0.18 0.39 0 1 Klarner (2012)
Estimation Method
Due to the panel data structure, we employ a two-way panel estimator with state and 
year dummies to control both state and year-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test finds that the mean value of the VIF test is 3.63. VIFs 
for all variables are less than 10, which implies that multicollinearity is not a serious 
problem for this study. A series of panel unit root tests show that the dependent variables 
are panel stationary, and thus fixed effect or random effect models are applicable to our 
analysis and their results are not spurious. It is known that if a panel is stationary, then a 
static panel data method should be applied; otherwise, a dynamic specification should be 
used. We use two kinds of tests, namely, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the 
Phillips-Perron test, with different specifications on lags, a linear trend, or a drift for all 
three dependent variables. All specifications reject the null hypothesis of unit root. 
Hausman tests are performed to test the specification of fixed-effect versus random-effect 
model. The null hypothesis, which states that the difference of the coefficients estimated 
by the two specifications is not systematic, is rejected, thus indicating the choice of a 
fixed-effect model is suitable.
We also conduct some conventional initial diagnostic tests before running the 
regressions. First, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test confirms that the estimated 
Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max Data Source
Divided Gov’t
A dummy variable indicating that the 
control of the executive branch and 
the legislative branch is split between 
two parties
0.58 0.49 0 1 The Book of States
Real Personal 
Income
Natural log of real per capita personal 
income 
10.11 0.33 9.2 10.9




Measure of income inequality ranging 
from 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (perfect 
inequality)
0.43 0.04 0.3 0.5
The Correlates of State 
Policy Projects
Ethnic Diversity
An index measure of racial diversity 
that varies over time and across states
0.23 0.13 0.0 0.7
Hawes, Rocha, and Meier 
(2013)
Female Pop (%)
Percentage of females in state 
population
0.51 0.02 0.5 0.7 U.S. Census Bureau
Educational 
Attainment
Percentage of bachelor's degrees or 
higher for persons 25 years or over
22.82 5.08 11.6 38.1
U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis
Social Capital
An index measure of social capital 
that varies over time and across states
0.14 0.98 -2.9 2.7




Percentage of population with 
Scandinavian ancestry 
9 3.39 2.9 19.7 U.S. Census Bureau
Urban Population 
(%)
Percentage of population residing in 
urban areas
70.49 14.68 32.2 94.9 U.S. Census Bureau
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residuals are heteroskedastic. Second, the Wooldridge test confirms the existence of serial 
correlation in error terms. Third, the Pesaran’s cross-sectional dependence (CD) test 
confirms the existence of cross-sectional dependence. Heteoskedasticity, serial correlation, 
and cross-sectional dependence will yield biased standard errors of estimated coefficients. 
To correct the above issues, we use the Driscoll and Kraay standard errors as Driscoll and 
Kraay (1998) suggest.
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
We run two rounds of regressions of the determinants of public corruption in the U.S. 
states. In the first round, our regression models separately include each set of the 
determinants of corruption one by one. We have four sets of the public corruption 
determinants: bureaucratic and regulatory determinants, political determinants, economic and 
demographic determinants, and geographical, cultural, and religious determinants. The 
second round of regressions includes all four sets of the determinants together. For brevity, 
we do not report the regression results of the first round in detail,2) but summarize which 
determinants are statistically significant in what follows. We only report the regression 
results of the second round in the body of this article and discuss the main findings. 
The results of the first round of regressions are summarized as follows. The positive 
(+) and negative (-) signs in parentheses imply the directions of the association between 
each determinant and the dependent variable (i.e., public corruption). Among the 
bureaucratic and regulatory determinants of corruption, the number of state public 
employees (+), the stringency of TELs (-), and the stringency of BBRs (-) are statistically 
significantly associated with corruption in the context of the U.S. states. Among the 
political determinants of corruption, voter turnout rates (-), political competition (-), the 
liberal ideology of state governments (+), the existence of a term limit for governors (-), 
unified control of state governments by Democrats (-), and divided controls of state 
governments (-) are significant factors of corruption. Among the economic and demographic 
determinants of public corruption, only income inequality (+) is significantly associated 
with corruption. Finally, educational attainment (-) and Scandinavian ancestry (-) are 
statistically significant and negatively associated with the extent of corruption.
At the second round of regressions, we combine all four sets of the determinants of 
2) Tables A.5~A.0 in the Appendix display the regression results in greater detail.
public corruption, not separating them. Table II summarizes the regression result of our 
benchmark models, which show that the regression results are consistent with those of the 
first round of regressions. We have six different models (Models I~XI) in Table II with 
different dependent variables (i.e., the measurements of the extent of corruption across the 
states). The first three models capture the extent of public corruption by the number of 
convictions per 10,000 state public employees (Corruptemp) at year t (Model I), at year 
t+1 (Model II), and average numbers over future three years (Model III). The last three 
models capture the level of public corruption by the number of convictions per 100,000 
state population (Corruptpop) at year t (Model IV), at year t+1 (Model V), and average 
numbers over the future three years (Model VI). We use shading to emphasize 
determinants that show statistically significant associations with corruption. The result of 
estimation looks consistent over all six models, as we summarize below. 
There is a positive association between the number of public employees and the extent 
of public corruption in the context of the U.S. states, which is statistically significant at 
the 0.1% significance level. Public corruption is likely to be higher in a state with a larger 
number of public employees. We may also interpret this result as providing evidence 
supporting a theoretical argument that corruption should tend to increase as the size of the 
public sector increases, as we use the number of public employees as a proxy for the size 
of the public sector, following Dimant and Tosato (2018) and Kotera et al. (2012).  
A U.S. state with a tighter stringency of state TELs is likely to have a lower degree 
of corruption, which is statistically significant at the 1% and/or 0.1% significance levels. A 
negative association between BBRs and corruption does not seem significant. Although the 
impacts of regulation on corruption are controversial across the existing studies, we find 
that state TELs reduce the extent of corruption by constraining public employees’ 
discretion on resource allocation in the context of the U.S. states. Likewise, it seems that 
a U.S. state government with a higher level of fiscal transparency is likely to have a 
lower level of corruption.
There is a negative association between voter turnout rates and corruption in the 
context of the U.S. states, which is statistically significant at the 0.1% significance level. 
We use voter turnout rates as proxies for the development of democracy or/and degree of 
citizens’ participation in politics. Public corruption tends to become lower in a state with a 
higher level of democracy and/or a higher degree of citizens’ participation because corrupt 
politicians are removed by elections (e.g., Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2015). 
Citizens’ liberal political ideology and unified Democratic controls tend to have a 
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negative association with the extent of corruption. Moreover, a U.S. state with a stronger 
degree of political competition is likely to have a lower level of corruption, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.1% significance level. This finding is consistent with the 
result from the variable of divided control of state governments. Competition for political 
positions helps politicians to avoid self-seeking behavior and, as a consequence, reduce 
corruption (Brown et al. 2005; Sharafutdinova 2010).   
A state with a higher level of income inequality tends to have a higher level of 
corruption. In contrast, a state with a higher extent of educational attainment and a higher 
percentage of population with Scandinavian ancestry is likely to have a lower extent of 
corruption. We capture the level of educational attainment across the states by calculating 
the percentages of state population acquiring a bachelor’s degree or higher for people who 
are 25 years of age or older. The role of education matters in reducing public corruption 
in the context of the U.S. states (Brunetti and Weder 2003; Truex 2011). 
Table II. Determinants of Public Corruption in the U.S. States (50 states, 1986-2008)









Bureaucratic Regulation 0.039 0.013 0.032 0.030 0.0138 0.025
(0.042) (0.038) (0.036) (0.029) (0.025) (0.023)
Gov’t Size Employees 0.108*** 0.060* 0.078*** 0.094*** 0.056** 0.068***
(0.029) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016)
Ln Gov’t Employee Wage 0.124 0.004 0.012 0.180 0.109 0.107
(0.530) (0.423) (0.347) (0.317) (0.254) (0.196)
Fiscal Decentralization -0.727 -0.061 -0.263 -0.469 0.035 -0.108
(0.532) (0.364) (0.334) (0.338) (0.239) (0.213)
Gov’t Fragmentation 0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0003
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0007)
TEL Stringency -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Balance Budgets 
Stringency
-0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006
(0.021) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Fiscal Transparency -0.063 -0.273* -0.213** -0.060 -0.198* -0.158**
(0.162) (0.157) (0.081) (0.099) (0.103) (0.061)
Voter Turnout (%) -0.018** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Political Competition -0.583** -0.228 -0.199 -0.408** -0.147 -0.145
(0.273) (0.321) (0.277) (0.177) (0.202) (0.177)
Citizen Liberal Ideology -0.003 -0.004** -0.004* -0.002 -0.003* -0.002*
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Gov’t Liberal Ideology 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Governor’s Term Limits -0.066 -0.045 -0.039 -0.055* -0.039 -0.038
(0.046) (0.057) (0.037) (0.030) (0.039) (0.025)
Citizen Initiative Dummy -0.188 -0.128 -0.115 -0.088 -0.046 -0.041
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Table III summarizes the regression results of our benchmark models (Models I~VI in 
Table II) and compares the determinants of public corruption suggested from multiple 
theoretical lenses. In the context of the U.S. states, the number of public employees and 
the degree of income inequality are positively associated with the level of state corruption. 
On the contrary, the stringency of state TELs, the degree of fiscal transparency, voter 
turnout rates, unified Democratic control, politically-divided control of state governments, 
the extent of political competitiveness, the percentage of population with Scandinavian 
ancestry, and the level of educational attainment are negatively associated with the extent 
of state corruption. We do not find statistically significant associations between the level of 
state public corruption and multiple variables suggested as significant determinants of 
public corruption from multiple theoretical lenses. These include the level of public 
employees’ wages, fiscal decentralization, the degree of government fragmentation, index of 









(0.193) (0.166) (0.104) (0.132) (0.118) (0.077)
Unified Demo Control -0.143*** -0.149** -0.111*** -0.095*** -0.089** -0.068***
(0.037) (0.056) (0.036) (0.025) (0.038) (0.024)
Unified Republican 
Control
-0.026 -0.091 -0.053 -0.025 -0.071 -0.044*
(0.036) (0.068) (0.039) (0.026) (0.046) (0.024)
Divided Gov’t -0.078** -0.141** -0.104*** -0.054** -0.093** -0.068**
(0.035) (0.066) (0.037) (0.021) (0.045) (0.025)
Ln Real Personal Income -0.055 -0.329 -0.067 0.088 -0.206 0.014
(0.409) (0.342) (0.320) (0.289) (0.223) (0.218)
Income Inequality (Gini) 1.388* 1.526** 1.551*** 1.049** 1.026** 1.070***
(0.704) (0.631) (0.347) (0.445) (0.390) (0.193)
Ethnic Diversity 0.087 0.051 0.027 0.074 0.038 0.022
(0.069) (0.066) (0.034) (0.045) (0.049) (0.024)
Female Pop (%) 0.121 -0.314 -0.610 0.358 0.037 -0.171
(0.547) (0.782) (0.510) (0.394) (0.551) (0.365)
Educational Attainment -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.040*** -0.027** -0.032*** -0.027***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006)
Social Capital Index -0.004 0.019 0.0155 2.39e-05 0.013 0.011
(0.034) (0.034) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015)
Scandinavian Ancestry (%) -0.040** -0.025 -0.030*** -0.025** -0.016 -0.020***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006)
Urban Population (%) -0.003 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0003 7.48e-05
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.00276)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150
R-squares 0.1035 0.1046 0.1584 0.0982 0.0956 0.146
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BBRs, citizens’ liberal ideology, government’s liberal ideology, existence of term limits for 
governors, citizen initiatives, unified Republican control of state government, per capita 
personal income, ethnic diversity, percentage of female population, social capital index, and 
the percentage of population residing in urban areas.  
Table III. Comparison of the Determinants of Corruption in the Context of the U.S. States



















Citizen liberal ideology Gov’t 
liberal Ideology Governor’s 
















* Significant across all the six benchmark models displayed in Table II.
A discussion of the cures for corruption (i.e., how to reduce corruption) should start 
from understanding the determinants of corruption because controlling the causes of 
corruption eventually leads its prevention (Jain 2001). In this regard, multiple approaches to 
reduce public corruption can be divided into three categories: the lawyer’s approach, the 
businessman’s approach, and the economist’s approach. The lawyer’s approach stems from 
the work of Becker (1968) and emphasizes the role of law enforcement to increase the 
cost of corruption, while reducing its benefit. This approach emphasizes efforts to increase 
the extent of penalties and monitoring to reduce corruption. The businessman’s approach 
provides public employees with sufficient wages, incentives, and compensations so that they 
might not engage in corruption. It also includes a provision of non-monetary and informal 
incentives, such as career development opportunities and reputation building. Finally, the 
economist’s approach focuses on reducing the discretionary power of public officials, which 
can be abused for their personal gain and corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1997; Andvig 
and Fjeldstad 2001). 
Most existing studies fail to find a statistically significant effect of the lawyer’s 
approach to reducing public corruption in the context of the U.S. states. For example, a 
higher extent of law enforcement, captured by the number of state judges, the amount of 
caseloads and the pending rates of state courts, working hours of the U.S. attorneys, and 
the amount of state judiciary expenditures is not significantly associated with a lower level 
of public corruption in the U.S. states (BLINDED, 2014). It would be worthwhile to 
perform an in-depth analysis of the ineffectiveness of the lawyer’s approach to reducing 
corruption in the context of the U.S. 
We fail to find a statistically significant effect of the businessman’s approach in 
decreasing corruption in the context of the U.S. states. As seen in Table III, the 
association between the level of public employees’ wages and the extent of corruption is 
insignificant. However, we should not come to the hasty conclusion that the businessman’s 
approach is never effective in reducing public corruption before we make further endeavors 
to investigate other possible policy instruments in line with this approach. 
Compared to the former two approaches, the economist’s approach works better in 
reducing corruption in the context of the U.S. states. A higher stringency of state TELs, a 
higher extent of fiscal transparency, a higher degree of political competition, and politically 
divided control of state governments can contribute to restricting the discretionary power of 
public officials and politicians. We find that all of them are statistically significantly 
associated with a lower level of public corruption in the U.S. states.  
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the roles of citizens are very important in reducing 
public corruption in the context of the U.S. states. We find that a U.S. state with a higher 
rate of voter turnout and a higher level of educational attainment is likely to have a lower 
level of corruption. Citizens’ participation in elections and their role in watching over 
public officials and politicians should not be overlooked, but rather highly promoted to 
reduce public corruption. Likewise, education matters in preparing citizens as active 
participants of democracy.
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